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Multilevel Governance: Framing the  
Integration of Top-Down and Bottom-Up Policymaking  
 
Abstract 
Scholars embrace multilevel governance as an analytical framework for complex 
problems, such as climate change or water pollution. However, the elements needed to 
comprehensively operationalize multilevel governance remain undefined in the literature. This 
paper describes the five necessary ingredients to a multilevel framework: sanctioning and 
coordinating authority, provision of capacity, knowledge co-production, framing of co-benefits, 
and inclusion of civil society. The framework’s analytical utility is illustrated through two 
contrasting case examples – watershed management in the U.S. and air quality management in 
China. The framework balances local and central actors, which can promote a more effective 
governance regime. 
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Introduction 
Environmental sustainability is a complex problem for national and local governments 
around the world. Sustainability policymaking challenges traditional governance models that 
focus on single issues confined within geographic or bureaucratic silos (Kettl, 2002). At the 
intersection of environmental, social, and economic issues, sustainability points to a multi-
dimensional, cross-jurisdictional, and long-term view of development that public administration 
in all countries must address (Fiorino, 2010).  
Multilevel governance has emerged as a framework for analyzing environmental 
sustainability and other regional or commons challenges (Balme & Qi, 2014; Bulkeley, 2010; 
Homsy & Warner, 2013). Multilevel governance sits in contrast to a decentralized, polycentric 
approach that celebrates local action (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012; Ostrom, 2010a; Sovacool, 
2011) or a top-down, hierarchical approach that privileges central control (Andrews, 2006; 
Stavins, 2010).  While cities may initiate environmental protection, they must coordinate in a 
multilevel manner with each other, with regional or national governments, and with other non-
state actors to be successful (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005). Cities operate within complex 
governance systems and variations in local government outcomes may result from external 
factors, such as connections with non-governmental organizations and support from a central 
authority (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008).  
Missing from the literature is a comprehensive conceptualization of a multilevel 
governance framework that tracks the various complex interactions (Caponio & Jones-Correa, 
2017). Existing studies typically focus on individual components of multilevel governance. For 
example, some emphasize the nested nature of multilevel governance in which cities interact 
with higher levels of government (Dale, Burch, Robinson, & Strashok, 2018; H. Li & Yi, 2014). 
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Other scholars stress the horizontal interaction between cities and with the engagement of non-
state actors to allow co-production of knowledge and policy (Homsy & Warner, 2013). Still 
others focus on the instances of interdependencies between stakeholders, whether or not they can 
impact policy outcomes (Alcantara & Nelles, 2014). 
The theoretical contribution of this paper is an examination of the manner in which 
various components of multilevel governance integrate to produce policy. This paper lays out a 
framework consisting of five interrelated parts: sanctioning and coordinating authority, provision 
of capacity, knowledge co-production, framing of co-benefits, and inclusion of civil society. Two 
environmental cases in radically different political and institutional contexts – China and the 
U.S. – serve to illustrate the universality of this multilevel governance framework and its value 
as an analytical tool. The focus of this piece is environmental management, but the goal is to put 
forth a generalizable concept of multilevel governance.  
Using this five-part framework, this paper shows how both countries, in seeking to 
reform environmental governance, have moved to a more multilevel approach. The U.S., which 
adopted a top-down, command-and-control system in the 1960s and 1970s, now faces more 
complex challenges requiring local knowledge and buy-in (Homsy & Warner, 2013). In contrast, 
China has promoted decentralization and relegated environmental protection to the local level 
where economic development priorities overwhelm other concerns (Kostka & Mol, 2013; Ran, 
2013). The Chinese government’s inability to enforce goals and regulations has led to more 
central leadership and sanctioning recently, but the situation still lacks a comprehensive 
multilevel approach (Kostka, 2016; Liu, Lo, Zhan, & Wang, 2015). Recent political shifts in both 
countries will test the resiliency going forward of different aspects of a multilevel governance 
framework.  
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Approaches to Sustainability Governance  
Scholars have long debated the appropriate governance framework for common-pool 
resources. In the 1970s and 80s, with limited experience regulating the world’s growing 
pollution problems, the general understanding for common-pool resource challenges was that 
management required a top-down, command-and-control approach often involving a central 
authority, such as a national government (Fiorino, 2006).  In the United States, national 
regulations and subsidies to lower level governments resulted in a much cleaner environment 
despite a rapidly growing economy (Andrews, 2006). However, this approach does not work 
well with complex problems (Fiorino, 2006; Kettl, 2002). When top-down policymakers do not 
engage local stakeholders, the result may be local people “biting back in unexpected ways” that 
threaten to undermine initiatives (Leach, 2008, p. 1784). Central mandates are often command 
and control regulations, which work best on environmental problems with easily identifiable 
pollution sources and relatively straightforward solutions. Such mandates provide little flexibility 
for adjusting regulations to local circumstances (Kostka, 2016; Mazmanian & Kraft, 1999) often 
resulting in the imposition of “naïve” one-size-fits-all solutions (Ostrom, 2010b, p. 363)).  
More recently the focus has shifted to the importance of local solutions to regional and 
global commons problems. Developed as a theory of small-scale, common-pool resource 
management, this polycentric approach has been applied to commons issues of a larger scale 
(Ostrom, 2010a). It emphasizes development of local solutions to fit local problems (Nagendra & 
Ostrom, 2012), which can create space for inter-local dialog, ensure redundancy of potential 
solutions, and increase accountability (Sovacool, 2011). Local approaches can also ensure local 
compliance (Davies & Mazurek, 1998) and encourage local policy innovation (Lutsey & 
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Sperling, 2008). However, a decentralized approach has collective action drawbacks including 
negative externalities, spillovers, regional inequity and capacity constraints (Feiock, 2013). 
Uncoordinated policies can create inconsistent and expensive regulations, incentives, or 
programs across local governments (Rees & Hossain, 2010; Salkin & Ostrow, 2008). 
An emerging literature argues for multilevel governance as a better framework for 
environmental sustainability and other regional or commons challenges (Balme & Qi, 2014; 
Bulkeley, 2010; Homsy & Warner, 2013). In particular, the failure of international climate 
change processes, such as the Kyoto Protocol, has sparked calls for more experimental 
approaches to governing commons issues (Keohane & Victor, 2015).  Researchers and 
practitioners maintain that sustainability involves the intersection of environmental, social, and 
economic issues, as well as requires actors to break through both functional and geographic silos 
to address the complexity of real world challenges. Jurisdictional mismatch of authority and 
responsibility across levels of government hinders environmental protection efforts by wasting 
resources, hampering innovation, and reducing regulatory effectiveness (Adler, 2005; Liu et al., 
2015; Qi & Zhang, 2014). Therefore, solving sustainability problems requires more systematic, 
multisector, and multilevel approaches (Homsy, 2018a; Sharma & Kearins, 2011). Multilevel 
governance has also been a framework through which scholars have examined other topics 
including migration policy, aboriginal self-governance, and smoking cessation policy (Marti, 
2018; Mavrot & Sager, 2016; Rodon, 2017).  
 
Components of a Multilevel Governance Framework  
Scholars first employed multilevel governance as a way to analyze the European Union’s 
relationship to its member states (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003). It is usually described as engaging 
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multiple tiers of government, not unlike cooperative federalism through which states act as 
agents of federal policy in the U.S. (Fischman, 2005). However, in a multilevel governance 
framework, cities not only interact with regional and national governments through a hierarchical 
structure, but also coordinate with each other and with non-state actors to achieve sustainability 
(Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005).  
This paper proposes a five-component framework for multilevel governance, which 
integrates hierarchical and horizontal interactions. The components are the coordinating and 
sanctioning role of a central authority, engagement of civil society, co-production of knowledge, 
capacity provision, and framing of co-benefits.   
• Co-production of knowledge vertically and horizontally so that local knowledge becomes 
part of the discourse in partnership with centralized policymakers and technical analysts 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Homsy & Warner, 2013). Such engagement identifies actors 
missing from knowledge generation and policy creation processes (Corburn, 2009). Over 
time, as expectations and commitments are met, trust is built among officials, who start to 
understand the positions and values of other actors, which can lead to prioritizing 
sustainability and more effective policy implementation (Laurian, Walker, & Crawford, 
2017). 
• Framing of co-benefits. Local governments may undertake environmental actions when there 
are co-benefits – for example, reduction in energy costs (Svara, Read, & Moulder, 2011), 
increased public health (Bloomberg & Aggarwala, 2008), or job production (Homsy, 2018b; 
Kostka & Hobbs, 2013). Such reframing of a commons problem can counter negative 
political attitudes and build consensus (Hawkins, Kwon, & Bae, 2016) and stimulate local 
action because residents see concerns as important to them (Metz & Below, 2009). 
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• Engagement of civil society. Citizen voice can motivate government action. Citizen scientists 
often monitor environmental issues and collaborate with institutions, such as universities, to 
advocate for change (Conrad & Hilchey, 2010). Citizens appointed to government 
committees push local environmental action in the U.S. (Homsy & Warner, 2015). Cities 
with wealthier and more educated residents participate in interest groups around policy 
discussions and boost sustainability outcomes (Cruz & Smith, 2016). In China, local activists 
have had some success countering top-down, non-consultative decisions, such as dams, 
garbage incinerators, and chemical plants (Johnson, 2013; Mertha, 2008).   
• Provision of capacity. Governments need technical, professional, and financial resources to 
act. As problems grow more complex, such as in the case of sustainability, more resources 
are needed (Honadle, 2001). Multilevel governance requires that actors have the ability to 
mobilize the resources and capacity that many local governments lack (Koontz & Newig, 
2014; Liu et al., 2015).  
• Sanctioning and coordinating authority. Multilevel governance needs a sanctioning and 
coordinating power to help frame the problem, determine the distribution of externalities, 
provide organizational structures, and enforce solutions on decentralized actors (Hawkins et 
al., 2016; Homsy & Warner, 2013). This authority provides a coordinating role to encourage 
local innovation and to engage multiple actors. This mechanism differs from the top-down 
system in which a dominant central power not only controls the science of sustainability, but 
also dictates policy goals and solutions. Rather, in a multilevel governance system, power is 
shared across the network. Still, the rule of law must exist and the central authority must 
have the power to sanction those that do not maintain their commitments to the goals of the 
framework. Inaction must have a cost (Keohane & Victor, 2015). Milward and Provan 
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(2000) in their work on the hollow state, acknowledge the need for a strong center to ensure 
network actors coordinate to meet public policy goals.  
 
 This article compares environmental governance in two case examples from countries 
with drastically different political, economic, and social contexts: Rouge River watershed 
management in the U.S. and Beijing-Hebei-Tianjin air quality action in China. The data for this 
analysis come from primary documents (such as policy documents issued by central and local 
government agencies, plans and project archives, technical reports, conference minutes, and 
speeches made by government officials) as well as secondary documents (such as news reports, 
journal articles, and books analyzing actions in the regions). The findings illustrate how the U.S. 
and China have moved from opposite positions – from the top-down federal governance in U.S. 
environmental action and from the decentralized governance in China – to a more multilevel 
approach. By adopting a most-different comparison (Seawright & Gerring, 2008), the article 
demonstrates that, even in disparate cases, multilevel governance provides a better analytical 
framework to understand the success or failure of sustainability outcomes. 
 
Case Examples: Divergent Analyses of Multilevel Governance 
The Rouge River Watershed in the United States 
The case of the Rouge River watershed in the State of Michigan shows the limits of both 
top-down and bottom-up approaches and the potential of multilevel governance when facing a 
complex problem such as non-point source pollution. The watershed consists of four waterways: 
a main stream, which is 71 kilometers in length and three major branches. All of the water 
 9 
eventually flows into Lake Erie via the the Detroit River. The 1210-square kilometer Rouge 
River watershed has more than 1.5 million people living in 48 communities.  
Until the 1960s, millions of gallons of oil and petroleum pollutants per year were dumped 
directly into the Rouge River by auto companies; waste from steel mills turned the water orange; 
and at one point, the river caught fire. The Rouge River became the most polluted in Michigan 
and one of the worst in the nation (Hartig, 2010). This was common in the United States as states 
and localities struggled to contain pollution in a decentralized manner (Fiorino, 2006). Local 
politics, the unwillingness to incur costs, and a lack of concern about other municipalities 
hindered cleanup, with cities dumping raw sewage into the waterways from which downstream 
neighborhoods drew drinking water (Holloway, Strickland, Gerrard, & Firger, 2014). Well-
connected industry officials undercut decentralized regulatory efforts by threatening to relocate 
operations (Andreen, 2003b).  
Frustrated by the lack of progress, in 1972 the U.S. Congress passed the Clean Water 
Act, which imposed federal standards on industrial polluters by requiring that they adhere to 
uniform pollution control standards regardless of where in the nation the facility was located or 
what kind of stream received its waste. To ease enforcement, the new permit system imposed 
strict technology requirements that constituted compliance, rather than regulators having to link a 
particular pollutant with a specific polluter (Andreen, 2003a). As a result, levels of toxic 
pollution in the Rouge River watershed dropped dramatically (Beam & Braunscheidel, 1998) and 
industrial discharges were no longer a major concern (Cave, 2003). 
As point source pollution decreased, a more complex problem became more prominent: 
non-point source pollution including runoff from farm fertilizers, pesticides, and animal waste as 
well as nutrients and pesticides from lawns, eroded soil from development projects, and oils and 
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salts from streets (Lyon & Stein, 2009). Local land use controls and the diversity of local 
circumstance made effective federal regulation difficult (Andreen, 2004; Holloway et al., 2014). 
In the Rouge River watershed, despite the reduction in industrial effluent, stormwater runoff still 
accounted for two-thirds of the heavy metal lead entering the river; and hundreds of millions of 
gallons of raw sewage flowed into the waterway every year (U.S. GAO, 1988). To tackle this 
diffuse, nonpoint source pollution, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency shifted to a 
multilevel approach in the region that enlisted the support of regulated communities (U.S. EPA, 
2003). Using the threat of an expensive federal court order that would create a watershed-wide 
stormwater authority to direct river cleanup, the federal government pushed municipalities to 
sign on to a collaborative effort, the Rouge River National Wet Weather Demonstration Project 
(Cave, 2003).  
The watershed was divided into seven sub-areas with an advisory group responsible for 
each. Sub-watersheds varied in terms of residential and commercial density as well as the 
amount of impervious surface. The regional structure allowed community differences to factor 
into local remedies. Dense urban areas might have to build infrastructure to control contaminated 
stormwater, while suburban or rural places could focus on reducing nutrient runoff from lawns or 
farms. A steering committee coordinated the work across the entire watershed (U.S. EPA, 2007). 
Over the years, the federal government spent hundreds of millions of dollars funding different 
watershed projects (Alliance of Rouge Communities, 2011; Copeland, 2012, 2014).  
In 2006, the steering committee evolved into a non-profit organization, the Alliance of 
Rouge Communities, which consists of 36 municipalities, three counties, and other organizations 
(Alliance of Rouge Communities, n.d.). The Alliance coordinates stormwater management, 
pollution reduction, and recreational opportunities (Alliance of Rouge Communities, 2011). 
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From the beginning, the project involved extensive outreach to residents and business owners to 
increase watershed awareness, prevent pollution, and enlist local knowledge (Powell, Ball, & 
Reaume, 2000). The result is a much cleaner river. The flow of polluted stormwater into the river 
has been reduced 90 to 100 percent, and the discharge of toxic chemicals has dropped to 
acceptable levels. People can consume the fish, wildlife populations are growing, and dissolved 
oxygen levels have risen (Hartig, 2010).  
Such collaboration represents an increasingly common approach to environmental 
governance in the United States. In most of these situations, action is a response to federal 
regulations with money coming from either federal or state coffers (Koontz & Newig, 2014; 
Margerum & Robinson, 2015; Robinson, Margerum, Koontz, Moseley, & Lurie, 2011). Pledges 
by the Trump administration to roll back federal regulations and cut funding of environmental 
protection, threaten to undermine the role of the national government as the sanctioning and 
coordinating authority, as well as the provider of capacity. The next few years will test the 
resiliency of multilevel governance as national level support declines.    
 
China’s Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Air Management Challenge 
Recent efforts to combat air pollution in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei urban agglomeration 
show some early of progress in coordinating inter-jurisdictional environmental efforts. The 
region encompasses two provincial-level municipalities (Beijing, the capital city, and Tianjin) 
and one province (Hebei), with a total population of over 100 million people and a total land area 
of 216,000 square kilometers. In the fall of 2011, consecutive days of heavy smog in northern 
China shocked the public and turned into a global embarrassment. The choking air pollution 
worsened in the following years. The smog disaster in January 2013 affected about 1.43 million 
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square kilometers of the nation and more than 850 million people (Beijing Municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureau, 2014).  Cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region 
consistently ranked as the most polluted with the average annual concentration of fine particulate 
matter (PM2.5) reaching more than three times the national standard and ten times World Health 
Organization standard (Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, 2014). Sources of 
air pollution vary by place with serious cross-border spillovers. Automobiles account for 31.1 
percent of the fine particulate matter in Beijing, while dust and coal mining account for the 
biggest share in Tianjin and Hebei respectively. About one-third of fine particulate matter in 
Beijing comes from metal smelting and coal burning in the neighboring places, especially Hebei 
Province (Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, 2015).  
Efforts to contain such pollution in China have been stymied by fragmented governance 
in which local officials have been fiscally and politically incentivized to focus on short-term 
economic growth. The first national Environmental Protection Law, passed in 1989, was not 
enforced at all (van Rooij, 2006). The central government environmental regulatory agency – the 
State Environmental Protection Agency, called the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) 
until 2008 – remained weak and lacked the power to sanction provinces and local governments. 
Local environmental protection bureaus receive guidance and directives from the MEP, but their 
budgets, personnel decisions, and political direction come from their local governments, which 
are reluctant or unable to enforce national regulations. The fragmentation undercut efforts to 
incentivize, coordinate, or sanction local government behavior in environmental regulation (Ran, 
2013), leading to great regional disparity in local responses to ecological challenges (Mol & 
Carter, 2006).  
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Starting in the late 1990s, the central government began including numeric targets for 
energy saving and pollutant reduction in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), with more 
sustainability goals included in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) (Kostka & Hobbs, 2012; 
Liu et al., 2015). The central government also sought to intensify local compliance by mobilizing 
financial and administrative resources, empowering national and local environmental protection 
bureaus, and increasing political pressure on local leaders (Liu et al., 2015). This effort achieved 
some short-term results, but was not effective in addressing complex problems. The top-down 
measures imposed one national remedy for all localities and disregarded differences in 
geography and disparities in level of economic development as well as inequalities in local 
knowledge and capacity, while leading to a “command without control” situation in 
environmental governance (Kostka, 2016, p. 58).  
In September 2013, the national State Council (2013) adopted an aggressive and 
comprehensive air quality action plan. The document specified five-year targets for air pollution 
reduction for all cities, including a 25 percent reduction of fine particular matter across the 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and called for regional coordination on air pollution reduction. 
However, breaking administrative boundaries turned out to be more difficult than expected. 
While MEP required each province to create local implementation plans, none of these local 
documents mentioned regional collaboration or accounted for regional spillovers (Beijing 
Municipal Government, 2013; Hebei Provincial Government, 2013; Tianjin Municipal 
Government, 2013). Policy measures focused on hierarchical accountability but not on regional 
inequality problems across localities or on framing the co-benefits of air pollution reduction.  
In 2014 President Xi Jinping called a meeting of provincial leaders and made a series of 
speeches urging a coordinated program to address both individual municipal problems as well as 
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commons challenges facing the region. Premier Li Keqiang declared a “war on pollution” as part 
of the leadership’s commitment at the 2014 annual meeting of National People’s Congress, 
China’s national legislative body (Larson, 2014). The direct intervention of top leaders 
strengthened the central authority to enforce the air quality goals, but also sought to provide 
coordination, capacity, and information for local governments. The State Council established the 
Steering Group for Air Pollution Control for the region, with members from provincial and local 
authorities as well as environment-related ministries at the national level (Wang et al., 2018). 
The central government provided billions of yuan in funding for the regional effort with 
municipalities in the poorer Hebei province receiving preferential allocation of the funds.  
The direct intervention of top leaders gave the MEP the political leverage to enforce rules 
and to sanction local leaders who failed to comply. The MEP now works with the Communist 
Party’s Organization Department, which is in charge of officials’ performance evaluation and 
promotion, to increase the pressure on these local leaders. In 2017, the central government 
ordered tens of thousands of factories to cease operations in a reported effort to control pollution 
(Hornby & Hancock, 2017; Koh, 2017). The MEP also sought to hold local leaders accountable 
to their constituents by making environmental information more transparent. Traditionally, 
negative environmental information in China is kept from public release, especially if it impacts 
business development (W. Li & Li, 2012). In 2012, the MEP started to publicly release an hourly 
air pollution index. By November 2014 citizens in every city could track their air quality via a 
website or smart phone, which enabled citizens to voice their concerns and become engaged in 
environmental governance.   
Provincial and local governments began to undertake bottom-up initiatives for joint 
actions and information sharing – at least on paper. In January 2015, Tianjin passed the Local 
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Act of Air Pollution Control, in which a full chapter was devoted to collaboration with Beijing 
and Hebei (Tianjin People’s Congress, 2015). Based on bilateral agreements, Hebei Province 
received funds from Beijing and Tian (860 million yuan in 2015 and 900 million yuan in 2016) 
in support of collaborative measures to reduce air pollution in the region. The joint efforts 
expanded to address regional inequality in economic development and public service provision. 
The mayor of Beijing, speaking at the local People’s Congress in 2015, noted that his city would 
“continue the joint work with Tianjin and Hebei to […] develop the mechanism for shared 
benefit and shared responsibility in economic development and energy saving and emission 
reduction” (Zhu & Yu, 2015, p. 6). Hebei Provincial Government similarly declared its 
commitment to “assist its prefectural level cities to collaborate with Beijing and Tianjin” (Hebei 
Provincial Steering Group, 2015, p. 18). At the same time, officials in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
region announced the formation of an agency to clean the air by taking measures such as setting 
regional standards and preventing non-compliant factories from moving from one city to the next 
(VOA, 2017). 
 
Discussion: The Emergence of a Multilevel Framework 
The case examples illustrate the importance of a multilevel governance approach in both 
countries. As shown by the Rouge River cleanup, the United States moved from a top-down, 
command-and-control system of environmental governance to a multilevel approach more suited 
to nonpoint sources of pollution. In China, the national government has tried to move from a 
decentralized approach to a multilevel effort that combines local action with national level 
sanctions, information and capacity support to encourage more local enforcement, and when that 
fails, national enforcement, which was lacking before (Balme & Qi, 2014; Kostka & Hobbs, 
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2013; Liu et al., 2015). The Rouge River case in the U.S. illustrates a success of multilevel 
governance; the Chinese case illustrates the manner in which a multilevel approach falls short as 
the nation struggles to balance central power and local initiative.  
In multilevel governance, the co-production of knowledge and policy occurs both 
horizontally and vertically. Federal officials in the U.S. recognized that different parts of the 
Rouge River Watershed required different cleanup efforts. The education and outreach efforts 
revealed that expensive, engineered pollution controls would be needed in more industrialized 
and densely populated areas, while less intense efforts were appropriate elsewhere. The 
knowledge of local residents helps target problem spots, such as particular businesses or farms, 
and find specific and effective solutions. The result in the U.S. has been a locally tailored 
cleanup effort, made more effective because every municipality participated under the EPA 
agreement. In China, the air pollution challenges are both from heavy industry and non-point 
sources. However, China is still struggling to build the avenues of co-production and cooperation 
that would allow officials to address social and economic inequities (especially in outlying, 
industrial cities in Hebei province) and national support for sanctions also is needed to force both 
industry and local government compliance with national rules (Kostka, 2016).  
Civil society in the U.S. has always played an important role in environmental protection 
efforts. In addition to local leaders, membership in each sub-watershed council of the Rouge 
River includes community residents and other stakeholders – and the effort includes an extensive 
public outreach program. Management duties of the cleanup have moved to a non-profit 
organization, Alliance of Rouge Communities, whose main members are local governments, and 
whose associate members include local research and educational institutions and environmental 
groups, which provide technical capacity and political support for the effort. These organizations 
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also have an independent right to sue and use the courts as ultimate arbiter.  In contrast, China’s 
environmental governance largely operates within the administrative system and with limited 
outside check-and-balance (Chi, Xu, & Xue, 2014; Kostka & Mol, 2013), which undermines the 
enforcement of environmental regulations. Citizen participation has been limited to information 
transparency about air pollution levels to raise public awareness, or tightly-controlled public 
hearings over environmental impacts of specific projects. The information disclosure act has had 
some limited impact with citizens requesting environmental information and pushing local 
officials to enforce anti-pollution regulations (van Rooij, Zhu, Na, & Qiliang, 2017). The new 
Environmental Protection Law, passed in 2014, allowed individual citizens and NGOs to seek 
legal remedies in pollution cases. The first case, decided in August 2016, found against the 
polluter and marked a first step toward more direct involvement of the civil society, though how 
this may transform China’s environmental governance remains to be seen.   
The framing of co-benefits component of the multilevel governance framework is also 
important.  In the U.S., the local cleanup efforts were closely tied to other economic benefits, 
especially around the recreation and tourism industries, which built political support among a 
wide variety of constituents. In China, local governments have tried to tie national air quality 
targets to reduced traffic congestion locally, industrial sector upgrades, and healthy quality of life 
gains. National and local officials recognize the need to address the regional inequality of 
economic development, but regional collaboration remains in its very early stages.  
The need for a coordinating and sanctioning authority in a multilevel governance 
framework is illustrated by the different results in the two cases. In the U.S. before the federal 
government intervened, local governments in the Rouge River Watershed were unable to address 
the externalities, which neighbors imposed on each other. The EPA’s approach brought scores of 
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communities together and enabled each to understand the challenges faced by others within their 
sub-watershed and across the entire region. The result has been an effective, locally tailored 
cleanup effort, which would have been less successful if every municipality had not participated 
or if the EPA had simply imposed a single solution for all situations. In China, after a push by 
the central government, local leaders developed the language for regional collaboration and 
embraced it in local laws and public statements. For example, Beijing has committed resources 
to help poorer neighbors in Hebei, although air pollution from Hebei’s factories continues to 
affect residents across the region. But enforcement of rules is uneven with greater pollution 
reductions in the larger, more urban, and coastal cities and regions while poorer and more inland 
places do not have the resources or political will to take anti-pollution steps. In some urban areas, 
the increased centralization has resulted in many anti-corruption crackdowns, but the question 
remains about whether these will serve as a deterrent (van Rooij et al., 2017) or if the 
government will simply put factories in the hands of other, more favored polluters. 
Capacity is also a critical component of the multilevel framework. The U.S. federal 
government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the Rouge River clean up – something 
that state and local authorities would not have been able to do on their own. Similarly, the 
Chinese national government set up a fund to support local efforts, with preference given to 
poorer municipalities with weaker fiscal capacity. The central government has also added more 
staff to the local environmental protection bureaus which are having a mixed effect on getting 
past the local protectionism of industries and moving towards greater emphasis on cleanup (van 
Rooij et al., 2017).  
Finally, the two cases illustrate the important role of sanctioning power in a multilevel 
governance system. In the U.S., the threat of an expensive lawsuit by the U.S. federal 
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government brought local players to the table and encouraged the collaboration to take place. At 
one time or another all three branches of the U.S. national government have exercised authority 
and helped ensure compliance with environmental rules. In China, the absence of environmental 
protection as a central government priority has hindered the development of environmental 
solutions and allowed industry and local governments to ignore the growing air pollution 
problems despite the adoption of national regulations. When the top leaders of the Communist 
Party decided to use their political power, the central authority was able to bring together local 
leaders to start to collaborate on pollution and other common issues in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
Region. However, the central authority has primarily relied on the Communist Party’s political 
accountability system, which ties implementation with local officials’ career advancement, to 
enforce local compliance with national environmental programs, or more recently, draconian 
crackdowns on local governments and local factories. Rule of law and access to the judicial 
system is underdeveloped.  Without the full set of multilevel governance components in place, 
especially legal authority, capacity and norms of civic engagement, there is little way for local 
governments and citizens to continue to pursue environmental protection if the national authority 
changes priorities. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has used a multilevel governance framework to analyze two complex and 
radically different sustainability issues in environmental governance. The framework includes 
five elements: framing of co-benefits, engagement of civil society, the co-production of 
knowledge, the provision of capacity, and the power to sanction and coordinate. The U.S., at 
least in the case of the Rouge River, has successfully implemented a multilevel approach that 
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embraces and illustrates the way the components of this framework can result in positive policy 
outcomes. The Chinese government is just starting to develop a multilevel governance 
framework that balances central authority with local knowledge and regional collaboration 
among municipal officials. China’s experiments with reframing co-benefits and engaging the 
public – two key components linked to success in the US Rouge River case – are still nascent. 
Two different cleanup outcomes have resulted so far. The water quality in the Rouge River has 
dramatically improved, while the air quality in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region remains 
unhealthy, though there are some early signs of improvement. Despite the immense differences 
in the size, population, and pollution problems in the regions, both cases illustrate the analytical 
utility of a multilevel governance framework. 
An important question moving forward is whether a multilevel governance framework 
provides resiliency by building local capacity, which can be used to hold higher levels of 
government accountable. Recently in the United States, the administration of President Donald 
Trump has begun to reduce the role of the federal government in areas of environmental 
protection and enforcement. Over time, the multilevel framework, through the co-production of 
knowledge and the framing of co-benefits, may have instilled norms and values at lower levels 
that cause state and local government and civil society groups to push back against the erosion of 
federal government support for environmental protection (See, for example Tabuchi & Fountain, 
2017.). Does the sharing of power within a multilevel system provide lower level entities an 
avenue of upward sanctioning power to push the federal government to continue enforcing 
environmental laws? In China, President Xi has started to sanction local governments and 
polluting factories that previously were allowed to avoid environmental enforcement (Xiangwei, 
2017). There is evidence that Chinese localities and their citizens are beginning to embrace 
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values of cleaner air (Kuhn, 2017). But without legal avenues of recourse for local entities, it 
remains to be seen whether local governments and citizens will be engaged and empowered to 
continue clean-up efforts if national government priorities change.  
A multilevel governance framework provides researchers with an analytical structure that 
potentially explains the manner in which top-down and bottom-up governance can come 
together. Future research can test its application in other circumstances both around issues of 
sustainability and in other vertically and horizontally integrated service provision efforts. In 
practice, this framework enables policymakers to understand the broad range of components 
needed to tackle regional and global commons issues.  
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